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INTRODUCTION 
USF&G showed in its Appellant Brief that the policy at issue 
is not ambiguous and the interpretation made is consistent not only 
with policy language, but with case law interpreting that policy 
language and the commentators thereon. An examination of the 
Appellees# Brief shows that the ambiguity claimed is contrived by 
juxtaposing two policy provisions and construing them out of 
context of their general application. 
The law is well established that even though insurance 
contracts are to be construed against the insurer, the insurer is 
still entitled to a fair and plain interpretation of the language 
used in the commercial context in which it is raised. Valley Bank 
& Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas. 776 P.2d 933 
(Utah App. 1989). Insurance policies should be construed to 
accomplish the intention of the parties while giving meaning to the 
language used in a plain and ordinary sense not contriving 
ambiguity, but attempting to accomplish the general purpose of the 
contract. See, Prosser Com'n Co., Inc. v. Guaranty National 
Insurance Company, 700 P.2d 1188 (Wash. App. 1985). 
What follows is an examination of how the Appellees7 Brief 
errs in analysis by taking independent contract provisions out of 
context and putting them together in a manner to create ambiguity. 
In fact, an examination of the record will show that the appellees 
have never established on the record that they did not receive that 
for which they contracted nor were they subjectively of the view 
that ambiguity existed. 
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ARGUMENT 
Review of Operation of the Policy 
It is a difficult proposition to prove in an appellate brief 
that a contract provision is or is not ambiguous. This difficulty 
arises because a finding of ambiguity is subject to the understand-
ing and interpretation of reading given by each party and judge 
deduced from simply reading the document in light of guiding 
principles of law. 
A mere reading of the USF&G policy makes clear the nature of 
the insurance transaction entered. The Sandts purchased underin-
sured motorist coverage for the purpose of obtaining insurance 
coverage up to $300,000 should another at fault injure one of them 
and prove to have a lesser amount of insurance. The obvious 
purpose of this coverage is not to create an excess coverage of 
some kind, but to make sure that up to $300,000 in coverage exists 
in a state where many carry the minimum of $20,000 liability 
coverage. The policy then allows the limit of liability to be 
reduced by the payment of another party which might injure one of 
the Sandts. The net effect of that limit of liability is to 
maintain the desired $300,000 of resource should an accident occur. 
When one buys an orange, it is expected it will be spherical, 
orange in color, and have a peel. One expects that because of the 
inherent nature of the product being bought. Similarly, when one 
buys underinsured motorist coverage, one expects to have coverage 
which takes into consideration the payment of a tort-feasor and 
provide protection up to a certain limit. To argue that this 
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coverage is somehow excess over the coverage of the tort-feasor is 
to call the product something else than what it is by common 
understanding. The very label "underinsured" acknowledges that 
some funds are available from another party and that one is 
attempting to accomplish being fully insured. There is no 
subterfuge in this concept which applies the plain language of the 
policy describing limits of liability. While insurance law 
correctly rejects technical language traps for insureds, some 
assumption in balance must be made that one knows the basic nature 
of what has been purchased. 
The Claim of Ambiguity is Without Substance 
Appellees strain to create the ambiguities necessary to 
establish their position. For example, on page seven of the 
Appellees' Brief, they analyze the law applicable to exclusions. 
No exclusion is at issue in this litigation. 
What is at issue in this litigation is a limit of liability 
provision. In plain language, it sets out the amount of coverage 
given. It is significant that the Sandts have not alleged any 
ambiguity in the limit of liability provision itself. Instead, 
they attempt to create ambiguity by construing the plain language 
of the limit of liability provision with the "other insurance" 
clause. 
The Sandts argue to the court that the "other insurance" 
clause found in the underinsured motorist coverage creates an 
ambiguity. They argue that the phrase "similar insurance" could be 
construed to apply to liability insurance on the Sturges' vehicle 
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from Farmer's Insurance Company. This attempted construction does 
not work for several reasons in addition to those stated in the 
USF&G principal Brief. 
First, the appellee's proposed interpretation requires that 
one must read out the limit of liability language entirely from the 
policy. Instead of attempting to harmonize the contract provi-
sions, appellees propose that the "other insurance" clause override 
the limit of liability provisions. This is inconsistent with the 
rules of construction providing that language should be construed 
to have effect. 
Second, page three of the policy, dealing with liability 
insurance, contains an "other insurance" clause which is similar. 
See Addendum. Taking the policy as a whole, it is difficult to 
conceive that the "other insurance" clause in the underinsurance 
coverage somehow reaches forward in the policy and replaces the 
"other insurance" clause in the liability portion. The location of 
the clause in the underinsurance coverage shows it is addressing 
underinsurance issues. 
Similarly, there is an "other insurance" clause on page four 
of the policy with respect to medical payments coverage and again 
on page six with respect to uninsured motorist coverage. In short, 
to the average reader of the whole policy it is clear that the 
"other insurance" clause at issue applies to the portion of the 
policy (underinsured motorist coverage) in which it appears and is 
not some loose conceptual cannon creating ambiguity. See also 
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Amendment of Policy Provisions - Utah contained in the policy for 
another "other insurance" clause reproduced in the Addendum. 
Appellees7 interpretation is also out of the commercial 
context of the policy. As pointed out in our principal Brief, Sean 
Sandt was not an "insured" under the policy covering the vehicle 
involved in the accident. The liability payment made to him by 
Farmer's Insurance for the Sturges family was as a claimant. 
Consequently, when the "other insurance" clause talks about other 
insurance coverage, one must assume from plain logic that the 
policy is talking about the persons to whom it is written, i.e., 
the insureds of USF&G. With that understanding in place, it is 
clear that the "other insurance" policy clause is simply telling 
the Sandts that if they have other underinsured motorist coverage 
insurance, USF&G will prorate its share of the loss with other 
insurers. If a member of the Sandt family is injured in a non-
owned vehicle, the USF&G coverage will be excess to any other 
insurance coverage available to the Sandts as insureds. Except for 
the personal injury protection coverage of the vehicle involved, 
Sean Sandt was not an insured of Farmer's. The USF&G coverage is 
excess only to the Farmer's PIP coverage. To hold otherwise would 
create a whole new concept of law holding that a claimant under 
another's liability coverage is actually an insured despite no such 
definition in any policy. The argument advanced by appellees is 
clearly strained and taken out of the usual context of what might 
be expected of the understanding of a person of average comprehen-
sion. 
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Finally, appellees claim on page 12 of their Brief that there 
must be some ambiguity because an insured would never collect the 
full $300,000 if the liable party always had some insurance. That 
conclusion is partially correct because the negligent party may 
make a payment out of his/her own resources rather than insurance, 
but without legal significance. The policy clearly explains what 
underinsured coverage is and how payment from the liable person is 
subtracted. The complaint of appellees is that they do not like 
the very nature of the product purchased. That complaint is not 
ambiguity. Nothing was hidden about the nature of underinsured 
coverage as it is fully explained in the policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The heart of this appeal is whether the policy reasonably 
informs the insured that an offset will be made against the 
underinsured coverage for payments made by the negligent party 
causing injury. No real dispute exists that the Limit of Liability 
provisions are not ambiguous. Appellees try to create ambiguity by 
taking plain limitation of liability language and distorting the 
meaning by comparing it with the "other insurance" clause which, in 
turn, is being misinterpreted by ignoring its well understood 
purpose, its commercial context, and the plain meaning of its 
language. 
This court should reverse the district court and hold that 
USF&G filled its obligation by the $200,000 paid. 
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DATED this I day of August, 1991. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY J ."'SANDERS', ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Policy Pages 3, 4, and 6 
[Taken from Record pp. 45 - 68 J 
EXCLUSIONS (Continued) 
a. private passenger auto; 
b. pickup or van that you own; or 
c "trailer" used with a vehicle described in 
a. orb. above. 
8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief 
that that person is entitled to do so. 
9. For "bodily injury" or "property damage" for 
which that person: 
a. is an insured under a nuclear energy liabil-
ity policy; or 
b. would be an insured under a nuclear en-
ergy liability policy but for its termination 
upon exhaustion of its limit of liability. 
A nuclear energy liability policy is a policy is-
sued by any of the following or their succes-
sors: 
a. American Nuclear Insurers; 
b. Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Under-
writers; or 
c. Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada. 
B. We do not provide Liability Coverage for the own-
ership, maintenance or use of: 
1. Any motorized vehicle having fewer than four 
wheels. 
2. Any vehicle, other than "your covered auto," 
which is: 
a. owned by you; or 
b. furnished or available for your regular 
use. 
3. Any vehicle, other than "your covered auto," 
which is: 
a. owned by any "family member;" or 
b. furnished or available for the regular use 
of any "family member." 
However, this exclusion (B.3.) does not apply 
to your maintenance or use of any vehicle 
which is: 
a. owned by a "family member;" or 
V 
b. furnished or available for the regular use 
of a "family member." 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for 
this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for 
all damages resulting from any one auto accident. 
This is the most we will pay regardless of the num-
ber of: 
1. "Insureds;" 
2. Claims made; 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declara-
tions; or 
4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident. 
B. We will apply the limit of liability to provide any 
separate limits required by law for bodily injury 
and property damage liability. However, this provi-
sion (B.) will not change our total limit of liability. 
OUT OF STATE COVERAGE 
If an auto accident to which this policy applies occurs 
in any state or province other than the one in which 
"your covered auto" is principally garaged, we will in-
terpret your policy for that accident as follows: 
A. If the state or province has: 
1. A financial responsibility or similar law speci-
fying limits of liability for "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" higher than the limit 
shown in the Declarations, your policy will pro-
vide the higher specified limit. 
2. A compulsory insurance or similar law requir-
ing a nonresident to maintain insurance when-
ever the nonresident uses a vehicle in that 
state or province, your policy will provide at 
least the required minimum amounts and 
types of coverage. 
B. No one will be entitled to duplicate payments for 
the same elements of loss. 
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
When this policy is certified as future proof of financial 
responsibility, this policy shall comply with the law to 
the extent required. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other applicable liability insurance we will 
pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the propor-
tion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all 
applicable limits. However, any insurance we provide 
for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any 
other collectible insurance. 
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INSURING AGREEMENT 
A. We will pay reasonable expenses incurred for nec-
essary medical and funeral services because of 
"bodily injury:" 
1. Caused by accident; and 
2. Sustained by an "insured." 
We will pay only those expenses incurred within 3 
years from the date of the accident. 
B. "Insured" as used in this Part means: 
1. You or any "family member:" 
a. while "occupying;" or 
b. as a pedestrian when struck by; 
a motor vehicle designed for use mainly on 
public roads or a trailer of any type. 
2. Any other person while "occupying" "your 
covered auto." 
EXCLUSIONS 
We do not provide Medical Payments Coverage for any 
person for "bodily injury:" 
1. Sustained while "occupying" any motorized 
vehicle having fewer than four wheels. 
2. Sustained while "occupying" "your covered 
auto" when it is being used to carry persons or 
property for a fee. This exclusion (2.) does not 
apply to a share-t he-expense car pool. 
3. Sustained while "occupying" any vehicle lo-
m cated for use as a residence or premises. 
4. Occurring during the course of employment if 
workers' compensation benefits are required 
or available for the "bodily injury." 
5. Sustained while "occupying," or when struck 
by, any vehicle (other than "your covered 
auto") which is: 
a. owned by you; or 
b. furnished or available for your regular 
use. 
6. Sustained while "occupying," or when struck 
by, any vehicle (other than "your covered 
auto") which is: v 
a. owned by any "family member;" or 
b. furnished or available for the regular use 
of any "family member." 
However, this exclusion (6.) does not apply to 
you. 
7. Sustained while "occupying" a vehicle with-
out a reasonable belief that that person is enti-
tled to do so. 
8. Sustained while "occupying" a vehicle when it 
is being used in the "business" of an "in-
sured." This exclusion (8.) does not apply to 
"bodily injury" sustained while "occupying" 
a: 
a. private passenger auto; 
b. pickup or van that you own; or 
c. "trailer" used with a vehicle described in 
a. orb. above. 
9. Caused by or as a consequence of: 
a. discharge of a nuclear weapon (even if ac-
cidental); 
b. war (declared or undeclared); 
c. civil war; 
d. insurrection: or 
e. rebellion or revolution. 
10. From or as a consequence of the following, 
whether controlled or uncontro//ed or how-
ever caused: 
a. nuclear reaction; 
b. radiation; or 
c. radioactive contamination. 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for 
this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for 
each person injured in any one accident. This is 
the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 
1. "Insureds;" 
2. Claims made; 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declara-
tions, or 
4. Vehicles involved in the accident. 
B. Any amounts otherwise payable for expenses un-
der this coverage shall be reduced by any amounts 
paid or payable for the same expenses under Part 
A or PartC 
C. No payment will be made unless the injured per-
son or that person's legal representative agrees in 
writing that any payment shall be applied toward 
any settlement or judgment that person receives 
under Part A or PartC. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other applicable auto medical payments in-
surance we will pay only our share of the loss. Our 
share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears 
to the total of all applicable limits. However, any insur-
ance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not 
own shall be excess over any other collectible auto in-
surance providing payments for medical or funeral ex-
penses. 
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OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other applicable similar insurance we will 
pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the propor-
tion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all 
applicable limits. However, any insurance we provide 
with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess 
over any other collectible insurance. 
ARBITRATION 
A. If we and an "insured" do not agree: 
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to re-
cover damages under this Part; or 
2. As to the amount of damages; 
either party may make a written demand for arbi-
tration. In this event, each party will select an arbi-
trator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they 
cannot agree within 30 days, either may request 
that selection be made by a judge of a court having 
jurisdiction. 
B. Each party will: 
1. Pay the expenses it incurs; and 
2. Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator 
equally.
 t 
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration 
will take place in the county in which the "in-
sured" lives. Local rules of law as to procedure and 
evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two of 
the arbitrators will be binding as to: 
1. Whether the "insured" is legally entitled to 
recover damages, and 
2. The amount of damages. This applies only if 
the amount does not exceed the minimum 
limit for bodily injury liability specified by the 
financial responsibility law of the state in 
which "your covered auto" is principally ga-
raged. If the amount exceeds that limit, either 
party may demand the right to a trial. This 
demand must be made within 60 days of the 
arbitrators' decision. If this demand is not 
made, the amount of damages agreed to by 
the arbitrators will be binding. 
PART D-COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTO 
INSURING AGREEMENT 
A. We will pay for direct and accidental loss to "your 
covered auto" or any "non-owned auto," including 
their equipment, minus any applicable deductible 
shown in the Declarations. We will pay for loss to 
"your covered auto" caused by: 
1. Other than "collision" only if the Declarations 
indicate that Other Than Collision Coverage is 
provided for that auto. • 
2. "Collision" only if the Declarations indicate 
that Collision Coverage is provided for that 
auto. 
If there is a loss to a "non-owned auto," we will 
provide the broadest coverage applicable to any 
"your covered auto" shown in the Declarations. 
B. "Collision" means the upset of "your covered 
auto" or its impact with another vehicle or object. 
Loss caused by the following is considered other 
than "collision:" 
6. Hail, water or flood; 
7. Malicious mischief or 
vandalism; >• 
8. Riot or civil commo-
tion; 
9. Contact with bird or 
animal; or 
10. Breakage of glass. 
1. Missiles or 
falling objects; 
Fire; 
Theft or larceny; 
Explosion or 
earthquake; 
5. Windstorm; 
C. 
If breakage of glass is caused by a "collision," you 
may elect to have it considered a loss caused by 
"collision." 
"Non-owned auto" means any private passenger 
auto, pickup, van or "trailer" not owned by or fur-
nished or available for the regular use of you or any 
"family member" while in the custody of or being 
operated by you or any "family member." How-
ever, "non-owned auto" does not include any vehi-
cle used as a temporary substitute for a vehicle 
you own which is out of normal use because of its: 
1. Breakdown; 
2. Repair; 
3. Servicing; 
4. Loss; or 
5. Destruction. 
TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES 
In addition, we will pay up to $10 per day, to a maxi-
mum of $300, for transportation expenses incurred by 
you. This applies only in the event of the total theft of 
"your covered auto." We will pay only transportation 
expenses incurred during the period: 
1. Beginning 48 hours after the theft; and 
2. Ending when "your covered auto" is returned 
to use or we pay for its loss. 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
Amendment of Policy Provisions - Utah 
[Taken from Record pp. 45 - 68] 
AMENDMENT OF POLICY PROVISIONS - UTAH 
PP01 9312 88 
I. LIABILITY COVERAGE 
Part A is amended as follows: 
A. Paragraph A. of the Insuring Agreement is re-
placed by the following: 
INSURING AGREEMENT 
We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or 
•property damage" for which any "insured" 
becomes legally responsible because of an 
auto accident. We will settle or defend, as 
we consider appropriate, any claim or suit 
asking for these damages. In addition to our 
limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs 
we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends 
when our limit of liability for this coverage has 
been exhausted. We have no duty to defend 
any suit or settle any claim for "bodily injury" 
or "property damage" not covered under this 
policy. 
B. The following Exclusion is added: 
We do not provide Liability Coverage for any 
person for "bodily injury" to you or any "fam-
ily member" to the extent that the limits of li-
ability for this coverage exceed the limits of 
liability required by the Utah Safety Respon-
sibility Act. 
II. UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
Part C is amended as follows: 
A. Section 3 of the definition of "uninsured mo-
tor vehicle" is replaced by the following: 
"Uninsured motor vehicle" means a land mo-
tor vehicle or trailer of any type: 
3. Which is a hit-and-run vehicle whose op-
erator or owner cannot be identified and 
which hits or causes an accident resulting 
in "bodily injury" without hitting: 
a. you or any "family member;" 
• b. a vehicle which you or any "family 
member" are "occupying;" or 
c. "your covered auto." 
If there is no physical contact with the 
hit-and-run vehicle the facts of the acci-
dent must be proved. We will only accept 
clear and convincing evidence, which must 
consist of more than the "insured's" testi-
mony. 
B. Exclusion A.1. is replaced by the following: 
We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Cov-
erage for "bodily injury" sustained by any 
person: 
1 . While "occupying" or when struck by any 
motor vehicle owned by you or any "family 
member" for which the security required 
by the Utah Safety Responsibility Act is 
not in effect. This includes a trailer of any 
type used with that vehicle. 
C. The Other Insurance provision is replaced by 
the following: 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other applicable similar insurance 
available under more than one policy or pro-
vision of coverage: 
1 . Any recovery for damages for "bodily in-
jury" sustained by an "insured" may equal 
but not exceed the highest of the applica-
ble limit for any one vehicle under this or 
any other insurance. 
2. Any insurance we provide with respect to 
a vehicle you do not own shall be excess 
over any other collectible insurance. 
3. We will pay only our share of the loss. Our 
share is the proportion that our limit of li-
ability bears to the total of all applicable 
limits. 
III. DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS 
The following is added to paragraph A. of Part E: 
Notice to our authorized representative is con-
sidered notice to us. 
This endorsement must be attached to the Change Endorsement when issued after the policy is written. 
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